Review of Economic Impact Studies for US Stadia and Sporting Events
In conducting economic impact studies researchers typically attempt to measure
the size of the additional direct expenditure created in the local economy by
the project, the indirect expenditure which this in turn generates, and the
less tangible external effects such as positive publicity and a sense of pride
in the community. It is important to note that a variety of approaches may be
taken in different studies and economists may place varying significance on
relevant factors. However it may be assumed that they all seek to evaluate the
same thing. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the nature, design
and use of stadia can vary greatly and so caution should be exercised in reviewing
individual comparisons. Nevertheless, a review of the results of selected economic
impact studies is valuable.
Much of the research into the economic impact of stadia is carried out in
the United States. It should be noted that economic impact studies of stadia
in US cities consider salaries to professional athletes as direct spending in
the local economy. On this side of the Atlantic however neither the level of
professionalism in sport nor the scale of salaries has reached that in the US.
Proposed New Stadium for the Minnesota Twins
The Minnesota Twins recently proposed a move from their existing home
to a new, purpose-built stadium in the city. A study 1 into the likely economic
impact of the new stadium was published in February 1997. The report looked
at the impact the new stadium would have under five headings: attendance, direct
economic benefits, construction benefits, indirect benefits, and community benefits.
In considering the projected effect on attendances at Minnesota Twins games,
the report notes that four recently-built baseball stadia had increased attendances
for their tenant teams by an average of 61%. The figures presented in Table
8.2A are calculated based on the attendance during the first three years after
the new stadia opened compared to the three years prior.
Table 8.2A Change in Attendance Levels for Selected New US Stadia
Stadium Percentage Increase
Camden Yards (Baltimore) + 44
Jacob's Field (Cleveland) + 118
Comiskey Park (Chicago) + 94
1
1
Page 2
3
The Ballpark at Arlington (Texas) + 22
Average + 61
Source: Arthur Anderson LLP
The report estimated that the direct spending generated by the new stadium in Minnesota would be in the region of £65.3 million compared to £37.6 million at the existing stadium 2 .
This represents an increase of £27.7 million or 74 per cent. It is projected that the extra spending will be provided by the team owners, their employees and fans.
The report also looked at the possible impact on jobs and concluded that the
existing 557 full-time equivalent jobs could be increased to 699 with the change
of stadium. It was estimated that the state and local tax revenues generated
as a result of a new stadium would be £10.4m compared with the existing revenue
of £5. 4m representing an increase of 93 per cent.
The report considered the likely benefits associated with the construction of the new stadium. The cost of construction was estimated at between £239 and £270 million. Over the four year construction period it was estimated that £142.4 million would be spent in Minnesota and that 402 FTE employees would be utilised in the project annually. In addition to the direct benefits outlined above the report considered the indirect benefits to the economy as the initial spending was passed on through the economy in what economists refer to as the 'multiplier effect'. A multiplier of 2.0 was chosen with reference to existing calculations for the region. Thus the indirect effects of the new stadium would be £65.3 million compared to £37.6 million at the existing facility. The indirect construction impact would be an additional £142.4 million.
Finally the report considered the effect on the local economy of certain intangible
benefits. Although no estimate of their value is presented the report suggests
that these intangible benefits may include:
. affordable family entertainment
. a regional attraction for the upper mid-west
. enhancement of Minnesota's national image
. community pride and tradition
Baltimore's Camden Yards Ballparks
Economists Bruce Hamilton and Peter Kahn 3 have conducted an independent
study into the economic significance of the Camden Yards complex in Baltimore,
Maryland. The complex was opened in 1992 and houses two baseball stadia. The
larger of the two is Oriole Park which is home to a major baseball franchise
while the other is the home of the Ravens football team.
According to this study average attendances at the Oriole's home games was 26,823
in the decade prior to moving to the new stadium. This figure jumped to 45,
129 for the first five years at Oriole Park. In addition the average number
of out-of-state fans increased from approximately 10 per cent of overall attendance
prior to the move to around 30 per cent after.
In terms of expenditure the report estimates that :
"Taking account of all of the measurable benefits of the Camden Yards
investment (i. e. job creation and tax imports), we estimate that baseball
2
2 Page 3 4
at Camden Yards generates approximately $3M [£ 2.3m] in annual economic
benefits to the Maryland economy, at an annual cost to the
taxpayers of Maryland of approximately $14M [£ 10. 8]. The net annual cost is
approximately $11M [£ 8.5m], or about $14. 70 [£ 11.33] per year
per Baltimore metro household." (p. 2)
Given the discrepancy between costs and benefits the authors warn that:
"Even at Camden Yards, public expenditure on the baseball stadium cannot
be justified on grounds of local economic development. If the
public subsidy is justified at all, such justification must rest on public consumption
externalities which accrue to Baltimoreans as a result of
the presence of the Orioles." (p. 2)
The authors concede that it is not possible to measure exactly the value
of any externalities associated with the presence of the team in Baltimore.
Nevertheless they suggest that it is at least plausible that the value is "substantially
larger" than the public subsidy that is required to provide and maintain the
stadium. However as the development involved merely the relocation of the Orioles
team to a new facility rather than the introduction of a new team, Hamilton
and Kahn cast doubt on the relevance of any such public consumption externalities.
In other words it is implied that the games may have occurred anyway and the
externalities may have existed regardless of the new stadium.
The study refers to a Baltimore City 1992 fan expenditure survey which estimated
the magnitude of non-stadium expenditure imports generated by the Orioles at
Camden Yards. According to the survey non-Baltimore area residents spent £35.4m
before and after games, mostly in Baltimore. It was found that 46 per cent of
fans were from outside Baltimore city while 31 per cent were from outside Maryland
state. Given the data on expenditure above, Hamilton and Kahn estimate that
the additional expenditure by out-of-staters attracted to the new stadium is
directly responsible for 460 new
jobs in Baltimore. In the case of the smaller Ravens' Stadium at the Camden
Yards complex the authors project that the public cost of providing the facility
will be between £10.8 million and £13.9 million per year. This is the equivalent
of between £14.38 and £18.49 per Baltimore household per year. As with the Orioles
stadium they conclude that the subsidy is only justified if the public consumption
benefits outweigh the subsidy although these cannot be adequately estimated.
Hamilton and Kahn draw the following conclusions from their study: The new stadium
generated sufficient new revenue to more than cover the capital and maintenance
cost.
The Orioles' fiscal picture improved dramatically as a result of the move; they captured much more than 100% of the surplus generated by the move.
Before considering the external public-consumption benefits from the presence
of the Orioles, the state and its subdivisions lose approximately £6.9m per
year on Camden Yards. This is approximately £9.25 per Baltimore household per
year; the public subsidy to the stadium is justified only if the public consumption
benefits of the Orioles are at least this large.
In addition to the deficit borne by the State, the national economy bears
approximately another £9.3m in costs. The authors are unable to determine what
fraction of this burden is borne by Marylanders, but they suggested that it
seems likely that the majority is borne by non-Marylanders.In direct impact,
the state and it subdivisions lose approximately £10m per year on the Ravens
stadium, depending on the amount of non-NFL activity generated at the new stadium,
and upon the fraction of such activity which would not have happened but for
the stadium. 3
3 Page 4 5
Since the Ravens play fewer games, the state has fewer opportunities to recoup
tax revenue from out-of-state fans than for the Orioles. Induced-employment
and out-of-state tax benefits are estimated to be approximately £0.8m per year.
The costs absorbed by the economy as a whole are comparable to those attributable
to the baseball park; approximately £9.2m.
In both cases the authors conclude that whether each stadium is or is not
worth the subsidy depends on whether the public consumption benefits are greater
than the subsidy. However they concede they are unable to estimate the value
of any such benefits.
The Super Bowl
American Football's showcase event, the Super Bowl, has been staged
three times in recent years at the Pro Player Stadium in Miami, Florida. Estimates
of the economic impact of these events on the South Florida economy is presented
in Table 8.2B.
Table 8.2B Economic Impact of the Super Bowl on South Florida
Direct, £m Indirect, £m
Super Bowl XXIII (1989) 58 116
Super Bowl XXIX (1995) 158 281
Super Bowl XXXIII (1999) 136 281
Source: NFL 1999 Note: All money values are in Irish pounds, converted from US dollars at current exchange
rates
An economic impact study 4 was recently commissioned by the Super Bowl Host
Committee associated with the Pro Player Stadium. The purpose of this was to
examine the impact on several visitor-related industries of the 1995 Super Bowl.
The results are presented in Table 8.2C. The total of direct and induced effects
on demand was estimated at £281 million for the local economy.
Table 8.2C Economic Impact of Super Bowl 1995 on Visitor-related Industries
in South Florida Industry Effects on Demand, £m
Direct effects:
Transportation 45.114
Eating and drinking 30.076
Hotels and lodging 25.977
Entertainment 10.166
Other retail 24.608
4
4
Page 5
6
Total direct effects on industry 135.942
Total non-consumer related expenditures 21.650
Total direct effects on demand 157.592
Induced effects 123.546
Total economic impact on demand 281.138
Source: Economic Impact Study of Super Bowl XXIX (1995), Sport Management Research Institute, Barry University
Note: All money values are in Irish pounds, converted from US dollars at current exchange rates
Proposed Philadelphia Baseball Stadium
A 1997 study 5 of the potential economic impact of a new baseball stadium
in the centre of Philadelphia was completed on behalf of the Central Philadelphia
Development Corp. This concluded that a new stadium would increase the overall
impact of the local baseball team from a level of £176m per year at their current
stadium to £321m, an increase of 82 per cent. The report claimed that the additional
economic impact would be based on "the greater number of fans and higher rate
of expenditure anticipated before and after the game at Centre City's numerous
high-quality hotels, restaurants, brew pubs, shops, cafes and other visitor
attractions". The study also included a survey of the team's fans' out-of-stadium
spending patterns over a five-game period. This found that the average per-capita
spending before and after games was £17.97, but for fans who spent time and
money in the city centre the average was higher at £35.07.
Survey of Public Spending on Stadia in the US
Economist Richard Baim 6 has carried out an extensive study of the estimated
£925m billion spent by US cities and states on building or renovating sports
stadiums between 1975 and 1990. The study assesses the size and nature of the
public subsidies implied by this expenditure. It also considers aspects of the
construction costs of stadium projects. The financial accounts of 15 stadia
were examined in detail and estimates of their public subsidies were calculated.
Also the nature and extent of external benefits associated with stadium projects
were considered. Further details are presented in Appendix 8.7 but it is useful
to review a number of the key findings.
Construction Costs
Baim assessed the extent to which the cost of stadium projects exceeded
their budgets. Of 15 stadia surveyed the average budget overshoot was 73. 4
per cent. The evidence presented in Table 8.2D suggests that early estimates
are poor indicators of the final cost of a stadium. This is an important issue
in considering the economic impact of the proposed Irish National Stadium.
Table 8.2D Analysis of Projected and Actual Construction Costs of Selected
US Stadia Stadium Projected
Costs £m Actual Costs £m Amount Over (Under) Budget£ m Percent-age Over (Under)
Budget 5
5 Page 6 7
Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium 13.9 14.3 0.4 2.8
Houston Astrodome 13.9 34.9 21.1 151.9
Indianapolis Hoosierdome 53.6 61.6 8.0 14.9
Kansas City, Harry Truman Complex 33.1 41.6 8.5 25.6
Louisiana Superdome 27.0 126.0 99.0 367.1
Milwaukee County Stadium 3.9 4.4 0.6 15.4
Minneapolis Metrodome 39.3 40.6 1.3 3.3
New York Shea Stadium 11.6 19.3 7.7 66.7
New York Yankee Stadium 18.5 75.9 57.4 310.4
Orchard Park, Rich Stadium 15.4 17.0 1.5 10.0
Philadelphia Veterans Stadium 23.1 37.0 13.9 60.0
Pittsburgh Three Rivers Stadium 34.8 34.7 (0.1) (0.4)
San Diego Jack Murphy Stadium 21.2 21.6 0.4 1.8
Seattle, Kingdome 30.8 51.9 21.1 68.4
Washington, D. C. RFK Stadium 4.6 16.7 12.1 261.7
Total 344.6 597.4 252.8 73.4
Source: Baim (1994) Note: All money values are in Irish pounds, converted from US dollars at current exchange rates
Aspects of Stadium Subsidies
Baim's study provides estimates of the accumulated value of public subsidies
involved in stadium investments. The estimates are derived using the method
of net present value. This considers all future revenues from an investment
in terms of their value today by applying a discount rate. If the discounted
value of future revenues is greater than the cost of the investment then the
investment provides a positive return.
In the analysis the accumulated net present value (ANPV) of subsidies to existing
stadium projects was calculated in retrospect. The figures thus look at the
present value at the time the project began of the revenues generated.
This provides an indication of whether the stadium project was a good idea in
the first place from a purely financial point of view. Where the ANPV of a particular
stadium has a negative value the continued operation of the stadium implies
a direct subsidy from public funds to cover the amount of the shortfall in revenues.
Table 8.2E shows that in 13 of the 14 cases where it was possible to calculate
an ANPV the figure was negative. In the case of the one stadium with a positive
ANPV the facility is actually privately owned and the subsidy involved was in
the form of finance for supporting infrastructure which was more than offset
by increased tax revenues.
Table 8.2E Present Value of Subsidies for Selected US Stadia
Stadium Years in Survey Accumulated Present
V l £
6
6
Page 7
8
Values £
Baltimore Memorial stadium 32 -2,251,487
Buffalo War Memorial Stadium 20 -644,133
Denver Mile High Stadium 22 -1,549,141
Los Angeles Dodger Stadium 34 6,158,074
Washington D. C. RFK Stadium 25 -8,305,982
Anaheim Stadium 25 -3,288,938
Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium 22 -12,749,530
Oakland-Alameda Coliseum Complex 25 -8,116,674
San Diego Jack Murphy Stadium 23 -6,934,832
Cincinnati Riverfront Stadium 20 -3,734,021
Foxboro Stadium 20 -791,735
Orchard Park N. Y. Rich Stadium 10 -12,677,575
Louisiana Superdome 16 -36,774,276
Minneapolis Metrodome 10 -33,516
Source: Baim (1994) Note: All money values are in Irish pounds, converted
from US dollars at current exchange rates
Of the five stadia with the highest ANPV (lowest subsidies) four are for cities
which incurred little or no construction costs. In other words there is a negative
relationship between construction costs and the size of subsidy. The variable
costs of running a stadium include game-day costs and general maintenance. In
more than 70 per cent of the years of financial accounts for 14 stadia reviewed,
cities made more in rent from teams than the variable costs of their stadia.
However the available evidence appears to suggest that, where large construction
costs were involved, the stadia were not earning enough to cover debt service.
The 14 stadia reviewed may be considered in three categories. Four were found
to either have a positive ANPV which implies no subsidy or else they were likely
to have a positive ANPV by the end of the stadium's useful life. These four
were therefore earning their municipal owners a return on the initial investment
by covering both operating costs and the fixed costs of debt service or else
they came close to breaking even. In the case of five stadia it was considered
that they would probably never recover their costs of construction but were
earning enough in rents and other revenues to cover their operating costs. According
to Baim "the vast majority of the stadiums built in the last three decades fall
into this category". Finally, five stadium projects were such that they were
covering neither fixed nor variable costs. 7
7 Page 8 9
Table 8.2F shows that the per-capita subsidies from cities to stadia varied
significantly between the cities studied by Baim. While the average per-capita
subsidy was found to be £14.50, the figure was as high as £64 in one instance.
Table 8.2F Per-Capital Subsidies for Selected US Stadia
City Per-capita Subsidies, £
Los Angeles 3.1
Minneapolis 0.0
Buffalo 0.8
Baltimore 2.3
Denver 3.9
Cincinnati 8.5
San Diego 10.0
Washington 11.6
Orchard Park 13.1
Oakland 23.1
Anaheim 23.1
Atlanta 25.4
New Orleans 63.9
Average 14.5
Source: Baim (1994) Note: All prices are in Irish pounds, converted from US dollars at current exchange rates
The financial accounts of 15 stadia were examined by Baim in order to assess the profitability of each project. Where the financial data on a stadium indicates that the project did not make a profit then it is generally assumed that the amount of the shortfall is a measure of the municipal subsidy involved. Where data is available on a stadium's operating profit and loss account a figure is presented for the number of years that account shows a profit. Where possible Baim has also derived a measure of the return on the stadium investment to the municipal authorities. This generally calculates the revenues received from operating the stadium less direct subsidies and where applicable such indirect subsidies as property taxes foregone. In a minority of cases a stadium surveyed is privately owned but its existence still implies some form of public subsidy such as the cost of supplying supporting infrastructure.
This analysis should be regarded as indicative only. For a variety of reasons
the method of estimation of profitability cannot be considered entirely consistent.
For instance tax rates and concessions to stadium projects can vary from state
to state and responsibility for covering match-day costs can vary between stadium
leases. Also financial data may be limited or not available in some cases. A
summary of Baim's review of stadium operating profit and loss accounts is presented
in Table 8.2G. Of the 10 stadia for which financial accounts were available
6 returned an operating profit in at least 80 per cent of the years surveyed.
Overall the average proportion of years of operating profit for all stadia for
which data was available was 72 per cent.
Table 8.2G Analysis of Operating Profit for Selected US Stadia
Stadium Years in
Survey Years of Operating Profit %
8
8
Page 9
10
Milwaukee County 33 18 54.5
Baltimore Memorial 29 18 62.1
Buffalo War Memorial 26 5 19.2
Denver Mile High ---
Los Angeles Dodger* ---
Washington RFK 25 20 80.0
Anaheim 22 22 100.0
Atlanta-Fulton County ---
Oakland-Alameda Coliseum 25 25 100.0
San Diego Jack Murphy 23 23 100.0
Cincinnati Riverfront 20 18 90.0
Foxboro* ---
Orchard Park Rich ---
Louisiana Superdome 8 0 0
Minneapolis Metrodome 10 10 100.0
Average Percentage 71.9
Source: Baim (1994) * Privately-owned facilities
A summary of Baim's review of the return on municipal investments on stadium
projects is presented in Table 8.2H. By contrast the average proportion of years
in which the stadium project yielded a positive return was only 32 per cent.
In only 3 of 15 cases was the average proportion of years of positive return
greater than 50 per cent, and one of those three was a privately-owned facility.
Table 8.2H Analysis of Return on Municipal Investments in Stadium Projects
Stadium Years in Survey Years of Positive
Return %
Milwaukee County 15 5 33.3
Baltimore Memorial 32 7 21.9
Buffalo War Memorial 20 2 10.0
Denver Mile High 22 12 54.5
9
9
Page 10
11
Los Angeles Dodger* 34 33 97.1
Washington RFK 25 9 36.0
Anaheim 25 8 32.0
Atlanta-Fulton County 22 0 0
Oakland-Alameda Coliseum 25 9 36.0
San Diego Jack Murphy 23 4 17.4
Cincinnati Riverfront 20 7 35.0
Foxboro* 20 0 0
Orchard Park Rich 10 0 0
Louisiana Superdome 16 0 0
Minneapolis Metrodome 10 6 60.0
Average Percentage 32.0
Source: Baim (1994) * Privately-owned facilities
External Benefits
In his study Baim considers the extent of positive external benefits
associated with a stadium project. A spectator attending a sporting event derives
utility or satisfaction from access to the facilities in a stadium but he or
she must pay for the privilege. However besides the direct benefits certain
less tangible benefits accrue to the wider community from the existence of a
stadium for which no direct charge can be applied. These external benefits may
include such factors as extra employment in the surrounding community or increased
civic pride for the host city.
Baim notes that supporters of stadium projects argue that as well as contributing
to a city's economic growth a facility brings "many improvements in the quality
of life to a city and its residents". A further argument is that regular mention
of a city in sports bulletins promotes the city as a location for holidays,
conferences, regional offices etc. While Baim agrees that external benefits
may be the deciding factor for a proposed stadium project he warns that traditional
analysis is not yet able to deliver general conclusions on this question. Instead
he examines a limited number of possible sources of external benefit.
Baim draws several conclusions from the various aspects of his study. These
include the following:
. direct municipal stadium financing almost always involves a transfer of
funds from the taxpayer;
. the size of the subsidies are variable;
. typically the subsidy takes the form of unrecovered construction costs. Leases
on stadiums built before occupancy that cover operating expenses but do not
recover all construction costs are rational; 10
10
Page 11
12
. given the nature of the subsidy, it is not likely that the fans receive much,
if any, of the subsidy;
. the justification for building a stadium revolves around external benefits
the city receives by hosting sporting events;
. evidence supports the existence of external benefits in some circumstances.
The external benefits are not universal.
Review of Conclusions on Public Investment in Stadium Project
In considering the proposed Irish Stadium it is useful to review the conclusions on the economic impact of stadia internationally.
The Impact of Additional Expenditure
Baim believes that many estimates of the economic impact of a stadium
investment are overestimates. He cites as typical errors the assumption that
the expenditure generated by the project would not otherwise have been spent
or would have been spent outside the local economy. Baim states that:
"In all probability, if there was no sporting event to attend, a fan
would go to some other entertainment event, such as a play, concert, or movie.
While there would be no employment at the stadium, there might be more jobs
at the alternative entertainment providers." (pp. 4-5)
The "multiplier effect" refers to the continuing, indirect impact of new spending
as it is passed on through the economy. Economists measure this effect in terms
of a multiplier. For instance, a multiplier of 2 implies that an injection of
£1 million of new spending will eventually result in £2 million of additional
spending. Following the initial exchange and each subsequent one the recipient
will save a certain fraction of it and respend the balance.
The choice of multiplier in an economic impact study can significantly affect
the results. However choosing an appropriate multiplier is often difficult and
it is likely that some studies overestimate the size of multipliers. For example
as noted by economists Robert Baade and Richard Dye 7:
"A study on the impact of the Pirates on the Pittsburgh area uses a
multiplier of only 1.2 for goods and services and 1.6 for wages and salaries.
... A study commissioned by the Philadelphia Sports Consortium uses a multiplier
of 1.7 obtained from independent research of the Wharton Econometrics model
of Philadelphia. The author of a study on the impact of a Class A baseball stadium
for South Bend, Indiana, represents as "conservative" a multiplier of 3.0. This,
despite the well-established result that the smaller the city, the smaller the
portion of respending that stays inside that area. A team-financed study on
the impact of Chicago baseball asserts a multiplier of 3.2." (p. 270)
To illustrate the point that low multipliers may be more appropriate when considering the economic impact on small, contained areas we can consider a study by Mark Rosentraub and Samuel Nunn 8. They found that local suburban communities had difficulties "in capturing the economic benefits of an investment in professional sports."
Reviewing the choice of multipliers for a range of studies and the model developed by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Frank Hefner 9 of the University of South Carolina warns that:
"One must guard against the use of over-inflated multipliers." (p. 12)
In a 1974 study American economist Benjamin Okner 10 concluded that older indoor arenas with little or no debt service made profits while new stadia designed for outdoor sports were
11
11
Page 12
the biggest money losers. Reviewing 30 arenas Okner found that only five were able to cover all of their costs.
The Impact of Intangible Benefits
It is important to note that there may be many benefits associated with a stadium project which will not be picked up by a financial analysis. This point is made by Baim:
"While the stadium investment... may not be a prudent financial decision
for a private ector investor, the increased leisure time options provided by
a team to a city's citizenry, the increased civic pride a successful team brings,
and the potential for increased employment under certain conditions provide
benefits that are difficult to measure in monetary terms." (p. 218)
In considering the proposal that a high-profile stadium can boost economic
activity in a region by enhancing the outside perception of the host city, economists
Baade and Dye 11 conducted an econometric study involving 8 US cities. They
concluded that "the assertion that a major-league-sports identity is a decisive
factor in the location or operation of manufacturing business is suspect."
In a separate study Baade 12 alone examined the income and employment consequences
of a stadium project for its host city. He found little or no evidence that
a stadium can raise income or create jobs for a city. In fact in the case of
employment he states that jobs may instead be:
"diverted from the manufacturing economy to the service economy, or
from higher-skilled to lower-skilled (and lower-paid) occupations." (p. 18)
Elsewhere Baade 13 warns:
"cities should be wary of committing substantial portions of their capital
budgets to building stadiums and to subsidising professional sports in the expectation
of substantial income and job growth." (p. 16)
Writing more recently Baade and Dye 14 state that:
"The evidence presented here is that the presence of a new or renovated
stadium has an uncertain impact on the levels of personal income and possibly
a negative impact on local development relative to the region. This result is
consistent with the possibility that stadium subsidies might bias local development
toward low-wage jobs. These results should serve as a caution to those who assume
or assert a large positive stadium impact." (p. 1) Economists Swindell
and Rosentraub 15 have examined the job-creation potential of stadium projects.
They report that the Gateway Project in Cleveland consisting of a stadium and
an indoor arena was intended to stimulate job creation in one part of the city's
downtown area. The project created approximately 1,300 new jobs but this was
at a cost of £231 million in public investment or over £175,000 per job. The
authors conclude that sports facilities are "extremely expensive job creation
programmes."
Conclusions
In this chapter we have reviewed various studies of the economic impact
of stadium projects. We have seen that individual studies have shown evidence
that a stadium can have a significant impact on the local economy in terms of
direct and indirect expenditure and other less tangible effects. At the same
time other evidence casts doubt on the size of the economic impact of stadium
projects. 12